

Metropolitan Sources of Political Behavior in Comparative Perspective

Results from a Ten-Country Study

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Abstract

This paper concludes a ten-country collaborative study of metropolitan regions and their consequences for political behavior. The analysis summarizes results from multilevel or ordinary least squares regression models of partisanship, national election turnout and local election turnout over the 1990s and early 2000s. Across most advanced industrial countries and beyond, the findings reveal an emerging new political geography that is rooted in metropolitan places. Divisions within and between metropolitan regions have increasingly replaced both urban-rural cleavages and national class interests as the determinants of electoral participation and partisanship. These new patterns help to account for the expanding bases of support for neoliberalism in most advanced industrial societies, and for emerging political cleavages linked to cultural divergences and globalization. In ways that vary with national systems of institutions, disparities in local and national voter turnout are also rooted not just in the socioeconomic composition of communities, but in the contextual conditions of metropolitan places.

This volume has investigated how metropolitan regions have influenced both whether communities vote, and how they vote. The findings demonstrate that the nationalization thesis must be revised. Class based, nationally uniform political cleavages linked to modernization can no longer be considered sufficient to account for patterns of partisanship. Nor can variations in voter turnout be understood solely as the consequence of national institutional differences or national cultures. Rather, in all the countries under scrutiny here, political behavior within metropolitan areas follows systematic, largely consistent territorial patterns. These patterns are neither pre-modern remnants of the past that are fated to wither away, nor purely the product of regional, ethnic and class differences. They are the result of institutional, economic, cultural and social influences embedded in metropolitan places, and are closely connected to the territorial dynamics of metropolitan change. Metropolitanization is thus contributing to a reterritorialization of politics. As this process proceeds, the sources of political behavior that these analyzes have revealed will continue to shape politics of nations across the developed world and beyond.

This concluding chapter synthesizes the findings from the individual country chapters. Comparison of commonalities and differences in the ten countries of this study will enable us to elaborate and defend the overarching thesis of metropolitanization, and to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms by which territorial change in metropolitan areas shapes political behavior.

In the 21st century, metropolitan areas have become the dominant form of human settlement. Although differences linked to historical legacies of urbanization have produced contrasts this process, a number of common elements characterize metropolitan areas throughout the world. Areas of dispersed settlement that stretch across a multiplicity of jurisdictional boundaries, metropolitan areas are functionally integrated by territorial flows of capital, labor, services and goods. Externally, these regions are embedded in national and transnational urban hierarchies. Some operate as the economic and cultural center for a nation or a wider territorial region. Others specialize in particular kinds of economic activities that dominate their metropolitan system of production and reproduction. Internally, metropolitan areas are characterized by a process of spatial differentiation, sorting and segregation. The typology of localities used throughout this book captures common elements of the resulting residential clustering. Localities within metropolitan areas diverge in size and centrality, but also in a number of other socio-economic and spatial conditions.

How do these conditions of metropolitan localities shape political behavior? The findings from the individual chapters of this volume enable the first systematic answer to this question.

Metropolitan patterns of electoral participation

Political participation is the fundament of democracy and therefore important for its legitimacy. Of course, political participation covers a much broader range of activities than the mere act of voting in elections. Nevertheless, electoral participation can be seen

as a useful proxy for political participation. It is not only a fundamental political act performed by the citizens in democracies. It is also one of the most reliable and often readily available empirical indicators of political behavior. A first step to unravel the metropolitan determinants of political behavior has therefore consisted in an analysis of levels of turnout in local and national elections, aggregated at the municipal level.

The act of voting has, first and foremost, the function of designating political representatives. On the one hand, electoral participation is influenced by the political and institutional settings of the polity in which it takes place. In this respect, for the individual citizen's decision to turn out at the ballot box on Election Day, the way in which a polity translates his or her electoral choices into policies is important. This relates, first and foremost, to the electoral rules known to influence the propensity of citizens to engage in the act of voting: PR systems, where every vote counts and voters can expect their preferred party to gain seats in the legislature have been shown to foster electoral participation.¹ Salience of elections is another important structural effect on participation, i.e. the extent to which election results effectively alter government policies that affect voters.

On the other hand, determinants of electoral participation obviously relate to individual citizens' resources and motivation to engage in the act of voting. Socio-economic skills and endowments associated with age, education and embeddedness in social structures are therefore a consistently confirmed influence on participation (Franklin, 2004: 16). Additionally, ecological analyzes of electoral turnout have isolated a number of aggregate socio-demographic variables that significantly influence electoral turnout (see Geys, 2006). Regarding, first, socio-demographic variables, population size has been shown to have a negative effect on turnout, most likely because the greater the size of the community, the smaller the probability becomes that one single voter will make a difference. Population stability is another important positive determinant of voter turnout, mainly for reasons of identity (a stable population fosters feelings of identity and therefore social pressure towards voting), information (knowledge issues and candidates increases with time of residence in the same area), as well as salience (due to migration, potential voters might live elsewhere and are unaffected by policies). Population heterogeneity has been posited to have directly opposed effects on turnout. Contestation among groups with diverse interests could foster higher turnout, but homogeneity could promote solidaristic mobilization among a group that identify with each other.

Aggregate figures on electoral turnout found in particular national and/or metropolitan settings must therefore be analyzed with variables ranging from the socio-demographic composition of the electorate, to contextual effects from a community's size, stability and homogeneity, to the political and institutional characteristics of a polity. In order to gauge the effects of metropolitanization on electoral turnout, we need to consider how much of the variance that can be explained by those predictors that are related to metropolitanization.

¹ Legal requirements such as compulsory voting are another important predictor for electoral participation. As no country in the IMO sample applies compulsory voting, this factor is not relevant for the purposes of the analysis presented here.

In all states, political institutions are differentiated into various territorial levels. The political autonomy embodied by these various levels implies that political participation in modern democracies is, inherently, a territorially layered phenomenon. The research program followed by the authors of this volume has consisted, first, to analyze the determinants of turnout levels in local and national elections. Second, in acknowledgement of the layered dimension of political participation, they have focused on the relationship between turnout in national and turnout in local elections.

Determinants of turnout levels in national and local elections

Political and institutional settings

As we have seen, national political and institutional settings play a first crucial role in determining the level of electoral turnout. In this respect, some of the cross-national differences in levels of electoral turnout (Table 1) can be assumed to reflect the political and institutional settings that are specific to various national polities.

With respect to levels of turnout in national elections, the figures reflect the cross-national variation well known from and explained by previous studies (see Franklin, 2004). The electoral rule certainly plays a role, as countries of our sample in which a variant of the majority rule is used are also those with relatively low turnout (e.g. Canada, the United States and Great Britain). Federalism (found in Canada, Germany, the United States and Switzerland) reduces salience of national elections - as the political complexion of the national government will not necessarily affect policies made by state governments - and therefore depresses national electoral turnout. Furthermore, the extent to which electoral choices impact on government policies is important, and varies cross-nationally. For instance, divided government, found in the US, is known to have a negative influence on electoral turnout, as are governmental party cartels - the main explanatory factor for the extremely low turnout in Swiss national elections. Finally, the peculiarities of voter mobilization in the transitional post-communist context (Kostadinova, 2003) explain the lower levels of turnout in the two eastern European countries (the Czech Republic and Poland) as well as in the former German Democratic Republic.

There are also great variations in overall turnout levels in local elections across the countries in our sample. Turnout in local elections ranges from very low levels of less than a third (in North-America) or little more than a third (in Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic), to middle levels of nearly half (Switzerland) or slightly more than half (Germany), to the high levels of nearly three quarters and more (in Israel, France and Sweden). Cross-national differences in levels of local election turnout are much less explored (but see Morlan, 1984). Potential explanations for cross-national differences are, however, possible on the basis of the theoretical arguments outlined above. First, the electoral rule can be assumed to play a role, with the turnout-depressing majority rule being used in local elections in the United States, Canada, Britain, as well as in most municipalities in Switzerland, while proportional representation is used everywhere else. Second, salience of local elections is higher in countries where municipalities enjoy high

levels of autonomy either based on legal status (such as in Germany and Switzerland) or on political clout (such as in France but also Israel)(Goldsmith, 1995, Razin, 1998). In contrast, due to relatively low local autonomy in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Goldsmith, 1995) as well as in Poland and the Czech Republic (Yoder, 2003), local elections there are only of limited salience thereby reducing voter mobilization.

Hence, there is a set of explanatory factors that can largely explain the cross-national variations of turnout levels in national and also local elections. However, variations in turnout levels within countries are at least as important (Table 1). How can they be explained?

[insert Table 1 about here]

Differences between metropolitan areas

A first step in analyzing the within-country variations in turnout levels has consisted in focusing on assumptions that relate to the supra-municipal context, i.e. differences between metropolitan areas. The analyses performed by the authors of this volume systematically implemented multi-level modeling techniques. They thereby recognize that the unit of analysis - individual municipalities - is necessarily nested within metropolitan areas that present peculiar features bound to affect political behavior independently from municipal characteristics. This assumption is derived from the metropolitanization thesis, holding that national and local turnout will not only vary within but also between metropolitan areas.

Across the country chapters, even though turnout patterns could be shown to vary significantly between metropolitan areas, there is however no clear set of variables that would be systematically associated with turnout levels or turnout patterns at the level of metropolitan areas. In some instances, the overall context of political culture seems to play a role, such as in Switzerland where much of the variation in turnout between metropolitan areas can be attributed to location in one of the three linguistic regions where turnout levels are known to be distinct. Similarly, in France, metropolitan areas located in the South of the country show higher levels of turnout in municipal elections, which can be interpreted as an influence of persisting clientelism in these areas. And in Germany, there is a major difference between metropolitan areas located in the West and those located in the East of the country where the context of post-communist transition has a lowering effect on electoral turnout.

While regional political culture is a strong predictor of inter-metropolitan variation of turnout levels and turnout patterns (and even more so for patterns of partisanship, see below), other variables also play a role. In the United States, for instance, metropolitan areas located in swing states systematically show higher levels of turnout in presidential elections, as a consequence of party mobilization in the race for presidency. Socio-demographic characteristics at the metro level also played a role, with high levels of immigration and a younger population depressing turnout in US metros. Finally, in

France, the overall size of a metropolitan area also had a significant negative influence on turnout in municipal elections.

As Sellers et al. argue in their chapter on the United States, metropolitan differences reflect a complex set of regional and local influences, and - we might add - one that varies across countries. All the more so, the existence of inter-metropolitan differences in levels and patterns of electoral turnout must be acknowledged and taken into account in the analysis. Multi-level modeling allowed the authors of this volume to do precisely this, as it allows metro-level characteristics to vary independently from municipal determinants. As it turned out, most authors have indeed found that multi-l modeling contributed to strengthening the explanatory power of the models that were estimated. This finding, by itself, challenges the nationalization thesis, suggesting that patterns of political participation vary across metropolitan areas within countries. There seem to be regionalization dynamics at work which, in addition to metropolitanization effects, contribute to a (changing) territoriality of politics.

Levels of electoral turnout and their metropolitan determinants

A comparison of turnout levels according to the different types of metropolitan municipalities (Table 1) clearly shows that there is no territorial uniformity. Rather, turnout levels are territorially differentiated across metropolitan places. Turnout is generally lowest in urban concentrations, and higher in most suburban municipalities but the poor suburbs, where turnout is often even lower than in the urban concentrations, particularly regarding national elections. This general picture is found in all countries under scrutiny, except for Poland where national election turnout follows the reversed pattern: turnout is higher in urban concentrations than in the suburban municipalities (we will come to this later).

Again, the two rival theses of nationalization versus metropolitanization provide useful guidance to interpret these territorial differences in turnout levels. On the one hand, the nationalization thesis asserts that social, economic and cultural groupings mobilize similarly regardless of where they are located. Analyzing levels of electoral turnout on this basis, one would expect that a high degree of uniformity in political participation for different social groups independently from where they are located. This means that one would expect socio-demographic variables to have the greatest predictive power for explaining turnout levels. Differences between municipalities according to this thesis, would stem from the diverse mix of socio-demographic variables that is found therein. In other words, this thesis postulates that it is mainly compositional variables of a municipality, i.e. variables measuring the distribution of socio-demographic characteristics found within this municipality, that explain the level of aggregate turnout therein. More precisely, the findings of earlier psephological literature suggest that turnout levels are positively influenced by the proportion of residents with high socio-economic status, the absence of disadvantaged groups, the absence of immigrants, high proportions of old citizens, as well as high proportions of families with children (see introduction by Sellers and Walks).

Opposed to that, the metropolitanization thesis suggests that the characteristics of the spatial context in which political behavior takes place, have a genuine influence. Hence, one would expect variables characterizing the spatial context of a particular location to have a stronger predictive power for turnout levels, even when controlling for socio-demographic variables. This view therefore claims that contextual variables, describing the spatial characteristics of a municipality within its larger metropolitan system, better explain levels of electoral turnout therein than do compositional variables. Drawing on the literature, a number of contextual elements were identified of which we assume that they raise aggregate levels of turnout at the municipal level (see introduction by Sellers and Walks): high rates of homeownership, residential stability, low rates of occupational mobility (out-commuters), electoral competition at the municipal level, small population size, low population density, as well as high levels of socio-economic diversity.

Table 2 provides an overview of the country tests of these hypotheses. First, regarding the influence of compositional variables on aggregate municipal levels of electoral turnout, a couple of clear results stand out. The positive influence of socio-economic status, old age, as well as the presence of families on turnout in local and national elections is generally confirmed (except for the case of Israel). Similarly, the negative influence of socio-economic hardship on turnout in local and national elections is also confirmed. Then, there are a couple of results that are not uniform across countries. For instance, the presence of immigrants in a municipality seems to have a positive influence on turnout in local elections in the United Kingdom, as well as in national election in Canada whereas it affects election turnout negatively in most other instances.²

[insert Table 2 about here]

Second, the country tests of hypotheses regarding contextual effects on election turnout have also yielded one very clear result regarding community size. Indeed, in most countries, turnout in both local and national elections is negatively affected by population size of a municipality – thereby providing strong evidence for the accuracy of the “small is beautiful” thesis. Effects of population density, where they are significant, also go in the same direction with turnout being higher in less densely populated places (except for national elections in the Czech Republic). Homeownership, across the board, has a positive effect on turnout in both local and national election. Residential stability was shown to have a positive influence on election turnout in most countries, such as in the United States and Poland (both local and national elections) in Canada (national elections), as well as in Germany (local elections). In France and in the Czech Republic, however, residential stability seems to affect electoral turnout negatively, at least in local elections. The proportion of out-commuters in a municipality negatively affects turnout in local elections in the US and in Sweden, but has a positive effect on turnout in France (both local and national elections) and Germany (national elections). For most countries, however, no significant relationship was found between out-commuting and election turnout at the municipal level. Regarding electoral competition, the country results are

² In the Canadian case, there is an interesting difference in this respect, inasmuch as the presence of immigrants depresses turnout in local elections but not in national ones. Walks explains this as a consequence of immigrant mobilisation focused on national but not local politics.

not unequivocal. Electoral competition affects turnout positively in the United States, but negatively in France and in Switzerland. As for economic diversity, most country analyzes show a negative effect on turnout (except in Switzerland and in French national elections), meaning that occupational homogeneity at the local level can be assumed to foster turnout.

Taken together, the results of the country studies clearly show that, even if compositional effects are controlled for, contextual characteristics of municipalities have a significant effect on turnout. This provides evidence for the metropolitanization hypothesis, according to which social groupings do not behave in a uniform way, but that political behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the places in which people live.

The relationship between local and national turnout

In all states, political institutions are differentiated into various territorial levels. The political autonomy embodied by these various levels implies that political participation in modern democracies is, inherently, a territorially layered phenomenon. The results of the country chapters provide intriguing insights into the layered patterns of political participation.

The rivaling nationalization and metropolitanization theses provide useful guidance for interpreting the findings on this issue. On the one hand, the nationalization thesis implies that widespread engagement in the political process will produce high, uniform rates of participation in national elections and corresponding patterns of participation in local elections. On the other hand, the metropolitanization thesis suggests that participation in local elections might follow a different rationale than participation in national elections. Rather than to assume a homogenization of local and national political participation across the board, the metropolitanization thesis leads us to expect the relationship between turnout levels in national and local elections to be territorially diverse, and to be influenced by spatial characteristics of municipalities.

The relationship between national and local election turnout is best captured by the differential between national and local elections. A positive differential points to a nationalized pattern of political participation (national elections are considered more important) a negative differential can be interpreted as a localized pattern of electoral participation (local elections are considered more important), while a differential near 0 suggest a territorially integrated - i.e. not layered - pattern of electoral participation. The results shown in Table 1 suggest that turnout differentials differ, first and foremost, between countries, but also between types of communes within metropolitan areas. Overall, these results thus provide strong evidence that against the nationalization thesis: neither does participation in national elections necessarily correspond to participation in local elections, nor are patterns of electoral participation territorially uniform. However, there is a need to differentiate this argument.

On the one hand, there are important differences between countries. A closer look at the turnout differentials between local and national elections indeed suggests that there are nationally varying patterns in the relationships between local and national electoral turnout Figure 1. First, there are countries, namely Sweden, France, Germany and Israel, where turnout in both local and national election is high. We can therefore speak of a group of countries with high and integrated political participation. This is consistent with existing literature emphasising strong relationships between local and national politics in these countries (see Page and Goldsmith, 1987, Hesse, 1991, Goldsmith, 1995), as well as a vertically integrated party system (Deschouwer, 2003). Second, there is a group of countries in which national election turnout clearly exceeds turnout in local elections and where we can therefore speak of de-localized patterns of electoral participation. This is the case for the United States, Canada, the Great Britain, as well as the Czech Republic. With respect to the Anglo-Saxon countries, this finding is consistent with the comparative local government literature, suggesting that the low level of local autonomy in these countries results local elections being rather low salience (see Page and Goldsmith, 1987, Hesse, 1991, Goldsmith, 1995). Third, Switzerland is the only country in our sample, where turnout in local elections exceeds turnout in national elections and where we can therefore speak of localized participation. For the Swiss case, this localized pattern of electoral participation is mainly due to a depressed level of turnout in national elections, mainly linked to stable governmental party cartel at the national level (Selb, 2006). Finally, there is one country, namely Poland, where voter mobilization is very low both for national and local elections - a situation that has been described to result from “widespread cynicism, and confusion resulting from a very fragmented party system” (Kostadinova, 2003: 751).

[insert Figure 1 about here]

On the other hand, and beyond cross-national differences, the relationship between turnout in national and local elections is also differentiated between metropolitan places - even though the general national background of the relationship between participation in national and local elections obviously plays an important role (Figure 2 to Figure 5). Nevertheless, a very clear cut difference appears between the North-American countries of our sample and the rest. In the two North-American countries, i.e. Canada and the United States, de-localized participation is particularly pronounced in the suburban belt, while in urban concentrations, there is less difference between turnout in national and local elections. The reverse pattern is found in all the other countries outside North-America: participation is generally more localized in the suburban municipalities than in the core cities of the metropolitan areas. (In Great Britain, however, this is less clear cut.). While the suburbs are the source of de-localized political participation in North-America, de-localized political participation is found mainly in core cities in the remaining countries. If we bear in mind that, in North-America, the overall context is one of de-localized political participation, this apparent difference simply suggests that, within metropolitan areas of all countries in our sample, the relationship between political participation in national and local elections is looser in the suburban belt than in the core cities. This is again strong evidence against the nationalization thesis: as the suburban belt extends and becomes a dominant form of settlement for a growing portion of the

population in the wake of the metropolitanization process, territorial patterns of political participation will become increasingly diverse.

[insert Tables 2-5 about here]

This also means that patterns of political participation in the suburban belt are more likely to be influenced by a wide array of variables, combining influences of socio-demographic composition, place-related context, but also nationally specific factors related to stateness or the party system. A first case in point is the observation that affluent suburbs consistently show the highest level of turnout in national elections, but the turnout in local elections is generally not very different from average. As Swianiewicz has suggested in his chapter on Poland, this could be an effect of combining high socio-economic status with a de-rooted lifestyle, i.e. that residents of these affluent suburbs have the mobility means to satisfy their needs in different places of metropolitan areas. While residents of affluent suburbs have higher opportunities to participate in elections in general, they are at the same time less interested in local politics and therefore tend to concentrate their political participation to national elections. This means that socio-economic status is not in itself an explanation for turnout. Instead, it has an explanatory effect only in combination with place-related characteristics - such as the life-style researched by the people living there.

The considerations regarding affluent communities are echoed by observations that the authors of some of the country chapters have made regarding communities with low socio-economic status. While mobilization in both local and national elections is generally low in these communities, localized patterns of participation have been found there in some countries (France, Israel), that can be explained by deliberate mobilization of political actors of problems that are found in these communities. Hence, party-political strategies can also affect the relationship between local and national electoral participation. This is to show, again, that socio-economic status does not, in itself, have an effect on levels of turnout, but that it is mediated by the contextual characteristics of the municipalities.

Metropolitanization of political participation

As this review of the country chapters' results shows, the political ecology of the municipalities plays a significant role for both national and local election turnout, but more so for the local elections. Compositional variables play a stronger role in determining turnout in national elections, whereas place-related variables are more important for turnout in local elections. As the local influences on voting work in very different ways in local elections than they do in national elections, we can take this as a sign for a "growing disjuncture between the ecological dynamics of national and local elections" (Sellers et al. p. 4). This goes against the nationalization thesis: local and national elections are increasingly independent from each other. And, as local elections are more influenced by place-related variables, they are also prone to be influenced by metropolitanization processes - as places change within these processes. De-localization is clearly linked to metropolitanization processes. Those factors linked to metropolitanization (urban anonymity, commuting patterns, city size) depress local

turnout strongly, but national turnout more moderately. Hence, metropolitanization is a source of delocalized participation. As Sellers et al. conclude, "for local electoral participation, and for the delocalization of national electoral patterns, the characteristics of metropolitan places have been especially crucial" (p.18).

Of course, we need to control for the national determinants of the relationship between participation in local and national elections. In this respect, we have seen that factors such as the system of central-local relations, national party systems, but also other national institutional features play a crucial role as their influence on political participation combines with socio-demographic and contextual variables at the local level. But even if we bear this in mind, some general predictions can be made about the ways in which the metropolitanization process - basically the continued urban sprawl and growth of suburbs - is likely to affect the relationship between local and national election turnout. In particular, there is an interesting complex effect of community size. In general, size depresses turnout - echoing the decline of community thesis. However, we have seen that size impacts more on turnout in local elections than it does on turnout in national elections. This means that community size counts more in local elections, plausibly because one individual vote is seen to weigh more in local elections than in national ones. Hence, if community populations increase with metropolitanization, this tends to accentuate delocalized political participation. Similarly, turnout has been shown to be positively affected by residential stability in municipalities. As metropolitanization can be expected to lead to demographic change, there is some reason to think that political participation will become more de-localized as a consequence. Hence, the accentuation of de-localized political behavior can be viewed as one important general effect of the metropolitanization process.

Patterns of partisanship

Metropolitanization has also had far-reaching consequences for patterns of party competition. Where metropolitan cleavages and coalition-building between metropolitan interests have grown to dominate electoral politics, the resulting patterns of partisanship suggest a broad influence on public policy as well. The evidence from the preceding chapters shows these patterns to be rooted in metropolitan and local contexts. The pervasive effects from these patterns represent neither an effect from nationalization nor a consequence of global external forces. Rather, across the advanced industrial world, parallel economic interests and cultural orientations growing out of similar metropolitan settings have contributed to the widespread shift toward neoliberalism, and to emerging partisan cleavages based on cultural orientations and cosmopolitanism.

National settings and metropolitan influences

As with turnout, cross-national comparison requires that the local, metropolitan and regional patterns of partisanship be considered against the backdrop of national political competition and other variations among countries. As Kitschelt has convincingly shown

(1994, 1996), parties compete in a political marketplace for votes. Voters are not simply on the supply side of this marketplace. They must choose among the alternatives that a national party system offers in the marketplace for votes. Although voters choose partly on the basis of their own ideological or policy preferences, their choices remained constrained by the range of positions that the parties offer. Wider national differences in ideology can also impose different conditions for partisan competition. Often, as comparisons of national welfare states demonstrate most clearly (e.g., Iversen 2005), these ideological differences among mass publics are bound up with entrenched national differences in public policy itself.

The variations in these elements of the national context, however, suggest an even wider influence from metropolitanization and the resulting cleavages. As Table 3 indicates, the countries in this study differ considerably in the average voter self placement on the standard left-right scale. Among the settled democracies of Western Europe and North America, the Swedish electorate of 2002 placed themselves further to the left than any except the German electorate, with a mean self placement at 4.74. In Sweden, the Social Democrats had not only won this and the previous election, but presided over the most egalitarian, most generous welfare state among the countries in the sample (Esping-Andersen 1986). Limited metropolitanization in Sweden contributed to this success. Unlike in the other Western European and North American countries in this study, suburban and other metropolitan constituencies continued to play a less pivotal role in national politics and policy. In contrast with the other settled democracies, only 32 percent of the Swedish population resided in metropolitan areas over 200,000 in population.

[insert Table 3 about here]

Elsewhere, metropolitan areas have grown to dominate national electorates. Suburbanization has given rise to new residential strongholds for conservative parties, and challenged left parties with new patterns of consumption interests and cultural orientations. Throughout Europe and North America, this aspect of metropolitanization has provided a powerful political impetus for the widespread shift toward the support for marketization that has become known as neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore 2004). Not only conservative parties but the entire spectrum of political competition has shifted to the right along the economic spectrum. This has been especially evident in the three Anglo-Saxon democracies, where high levels of metropolitanization accompanied high levels of overall socioeconomic inequality. All three countries entered the 1980s with more limited welfare states than northern or central Europe. In all three, party competition and policy debate into the early 2000s centered around marketization and welfare state retrenchment. The contrast with Sweden was clearest for the United States, where the mean voter in 2004 stood at 5.82. In Canada and Britain as well, although local government consolidation had limited metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation, high metropolitanization and socioeconomic inequality went along with more conservative voters. The victories of the Liberals in Canada and of New Labor in Britain both came about as a result of shifts to the right to appeal to conservative metropolitan constituencies.

In France, Switzerland and Germany, metropolitanization has generated electoral cleavages and patterns of competition under intermediate and lower levels of socioeconomic inequality. In these countries, the wider trends of political competition and policy suggest more ambiguous political effects from metropolitan divisions. In each case, what Esping-Andersen called Christian Democratic welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990) provided high but less egalitarian or statist benefits. The Right had succeeded more consistently in France and Switzerland over the late 1990s and 2000s, and Left had won both the 1998 and 2002 elections in Germany. But in all three countries, pitched battles over the welfare state were a consistent feature of national politics over the 1990s and early 2000s.

The three cases beyond Western Europe and North America reflect a similar contrast among trajectories of metropolitanization and political partisanship. In Israel, extensive metropolitanization and high socioeconomic inequality went along with the most conservative average voter self placement of any country in the study. In both the Czech Republic and Poland metropolitanization and inequality were much less advanced, and voters placed themselves significantly more to the left.

In pointing to metropolitan political ecology, we in no way intend to supplant the vast literature in comparative politics and public policy that has analyzed these variations among countries at the national level. The evidence from this study, however, points to a the critical, heretofore underexamined role of metropolitan political ecology in these contrasting national trajectories. The widespread shift toward metropolitanization and its political consequences provides both a powerful explanation from below for such convergent developments, and a basis for understanding significant variations in them.

The analysis also points beyond accounts that have portrayed ethnic and racial diversity as a common impediment to the provision of public goods or the growth of welfare states (e.g., Alesina, Easterly and Baqir 1999; Alesina and Glaeser 2004), or the spread of affluence and education as general influences on mass publics (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As outlined by Sellers and Walks, and elaborated in the country chapters of this volume, specific trajectories of metropolitan settlement have promoted distinct economic interests and cultural orientations that have in turn influenced voter preferences, and ultimately policy choices. Ethnicity and race have played a role in these trajectories, but other economic and cultural influences are also clearly at work. Depending on the local conditions, and the dimension of political ideology in question, greater local diversity can foster stronger support for either the left or the right.

Metropolitan patterns of voter self-placement

A comparison of voter self-placement on the standard left-right scale highlights many of the most important general findings from the country studies. On the one hand, metropolitanization has given rise to new sociospatial bases for left-right cleavages that are rooted in the systematic differences among types of metropolitan places. On the other hand, the variations in these patterns among the countries in this study manifest how

different successful coalitions on the Left and the Right have drawn support from different types of places.

Despite broad, consistent contrasts between partisan voting in similar kinds of towns, the patterns in most countries ultimately demonstrate complex and often shifting patterns. Ideological indexes based on the self-placement of voters for each of the parties in contemporaneous surveys enabled an analysis of where each locality stands on the left right spectrum. Based on these results, we attributed left-right self-placement to each locality on the basis of the party composition of votes there. This process enabled the ratings on the left-right scale to capture choices of each community among the alternatives as perceived by the voters.

Across the entire range of countries, the typology and the continuous variables both manifest consistent patterns of support. Among the settled democracies, where metropolitan areas now dominate the electorate, partisan cleavages are now clearly cleavages among metropolitan places. Regardless of which party wins, the urban concentrations have given stronger support for the Left than the middle class, low density and affluent suburbs (Table 4). In each country, the affluent and low density suburbs harbor the strongest support for the Right. Middle class suburbs stand between these other types. They have consistently voted more to the Right than the urban concentrations, but more for the Left than either the low density or the affluent suburbs. In the only partial exception, densely populated Britain, the middle class suburbs stood only a hundredth of a point to the left of low density suburbs.

[insert Table 4 about here]

As multivariate testing showed, these patterns represent far more than a reflection of the social and economic composition of these places (Table 5). Even alongside the compositional variables, population density emerged as the most consistent predictor of voting on the Left Right scale. In every country but Sweden, denser localities voted Left while more sparsely populated areas voted Right. Homeownership also made much of the difference in support for the Right. In every country where this variable was tested except for Canada, communities with more homeowners gave significantly greater support to the Right.

[insert Table 5 about here]

Socioeconomic composition remained a major source of the intrametropolitan variation. Minority or immigrant concentrations voted Left with some degree of consistency in every country except Canada. In every country except Germany and France, communities with greater socioeconomic hardship voted significantly more to the Left. In four of the seven countries, and by a separate measure of income in France, communities with higher overall socioeconomic status voted more for the Right. Older communities also supported the Right more in five of the seven countries.

In every country, with the partial exception of Sweden, the multivariate models showed the contextual variables linked to metropolitan places to account for variations beyond what the socioeconomic makeup of communities could explain. In different national contexts of partisan competition, policy and metropolitan, parties of the Left and Right succeeded in appeals to different coalitions of metropolitan communities.

In Sweden, the one settled democracy with low metropolitanization, the Social Democrats had managed to maintain power over the study period here. Even when the Right had won national power in Sweden during the 1990s and in the 2000s, it had refrained from challenging the foundations of the Social Democratic welfare state. Unlike in the other countries, the suburban, middle class suburbs lacked the political weight to influence this result. In both the 1998 and the 2002 elections, the Social Democrats built winning electoral coalitions around the urban concentrations and high hardship suburbs, especially those with larger concentrations of immigrants (Table 4). With solid support in the rural and other nonmetropolitan areas that made up a majority nationwide, the Social Democrats had no need to appeal to suburbanites. As a result, more than in any other country, the affluent enclaves and even the middle class suburbs played a marginal role in the Social Democratic victories. As Bäck's analysis has shown (this volume), the partisan orientations of communities sorted out according to the socioeconomic class of communities (Table 5). Among the contextual variables, only single-family homeownership emerged as a consistent predictor of support for the Right.

In the settled democracies with high levels of metropolitanization, however, partisan voting followed a variety of different patterns linked to the characteristics of metropolitan places and the partisan options presented to voters. In Switzerland and the United States, the two countries where the elections in this study registered victories for both the Right and the Left, the overall metropolitan patterns are several respects remarkably similar. In both countries, the Right had performed best in low density suburbs. In both, affluent enclaves also harbored strong concentrations of support for the Right. Middle class suburbs, although more moderate than these other types, also voted solidly for the Right over the Left. An array of identical effects from the local contextual influences on voting reinforced these similarities. In both countries, parties of the Right have won significant support from suburban communities with more dynamic local economies that attracted more mobile residents. Lower residential stability and stronger local growth each contributed to support for the Right. So did a more diverse local occupational composition, and larger numbers of commuters among residents.

Important differences in the partisan choices of disadvantaged communities also distinguished the Swiss patterns from the United States. In the United States, ethnic and racial minorities dominated the electorates of many of these communities, but not others. Where minorities concentrated, their votes gave strong support to the Left. In Switzerland, as in several other European countries, proportions of immigrants (the closest available indicator of a minority ethnic presence) generally concentrated in poorer communities but remained only a minority of those communities. As a result, reactions among the ethnic majority of those communities to the minority presence played a greater role in local partisan trends than the votes of minorities themselves. The surge of the

Swiss People's Party among these communities yielded nearly as strong a support for the Right as in the middle class suburbs. High hardship U.S. localities with smaller proportions of minorities manifested a similar trend toward Republican voting. The contrary directions of continuous variables for minorities and immigrants in Switzerland and the U.S. confirmed this difference.

The Canadian and French elections analyzed here demonstrate different ways that the Right has been able to reach beyond the metropolitan bases of support apparent in the Swiss and U.S. cases to win elections. In Canada, where the Liberals won the election of 2000 on a moderate right platform, the divergence from metropolitan patterns in other countries is especially notable. The high hardship suburbs, including those with large numbers of immigrants and other minorities, furnished a critical base of Liberal support. Not only high socioeconomic status and older populations, but socioeconomic hardship emerged as a significant predictor of conservative voting.

In France in 2002, the collapse in support for the Left that produced Chirac's victory in the Presidential elections was apparent in every type of locality except for the working class suburbs. With tepid support for the Left in the urban centers or middle class suburbs, and inroads by the National Front in the hardship suburbs with significant proportions of minorities, high hardship suburbs with a low minority presence remained the sole bastion for the Left. As a result, residential stability, commuters, and housing growth all corresponded to left support.

In Great Britain in 2000 and Germany in 2002, the results demonstrated how the Left has been able to win national majorities under conditions of high metropolitanization. At the level of national policy, both New Labor in Britain and the Red-Green coalition under Schroeder had challenged traditional labor interests on the Left. In clear contrast with the French Socialists in 2002, their platforms incorporated reforms to welfare and market-oriented economic policies, and appeals to suburban voters on cultural and cosmopolitan dimensions.³ In both Great Britain and West Germany, the Left managed close the gap in support between urban concentrations and both middle class and low density suburbs. In both Left parties retained as strong or nearly as strong a support in high hardship suburbs as in the urban concentrations. In Germany, Schroeder was able to win surprisingly significant support among higher income communities, as well as more densely populated and less rapidly growing communities. In Britain, except for greater strength among faster growing commuter towns and those with more transient electorates, metropolitan patterns of support for Blair resembled those for the U.S. Democratic Party candidates for President.

In Eastern Europe and Israel, metropolitan patterns of partisanship are more difficult to discern from the Left-Right self-placement of voters. Alongside the parallel case of Eastern Germany, the Czech and Polish typologies suggest a variety of national patterns. Israel, where Left self placement is much stronger among the Arab minority localities

³ The Comparative Manifestos project data confirm shifts to the right by both Labour and the SPD on state-market issues in the 1990s and 2000s. French Socialists continued in 2002 to advocate more statist than market-oriented policy platforms.

than in anywhere else, follows a different pattern altogether. The regression models nonetheless reveal two patterns common to eastern Europe as well as Israel. As in the nearly all other countries, high local socioeconomic hardship predicts stronger voting for the Left. In stark contrast with the nearly uniform results in North America and Western Europe, however, population density (or city size) predicts stronger support for the Right rather than the Left. This last result points a distinct political economy of metropolitan political ecology that is likely common to other developing and transitional countries. Since metropolitan economic activity and the social privileges linked to it remain more confined to urban centers and their immediate surroundings, economic conservatism and cosmopolitanism have thrived alongside each other.

With the partial exception of the Swedish case, the multivariate analyzes have confirmed the significance of contextual elements in these variations within each country. Even as compositional variables have often predicted more of the patterns, the contextual variables have added significant power to the explanations. The resulting patterns point to an important, consistent set of metropolitan cleavages wherever metropolitanization has absorbed the majority of the electorate into extended urban regions. The Right has drawn new support from voters with interests and orientations rooted in suburban localities of homeowners, low density settlement and concentrated privilege. The Left has draw support from urbanized places with more renters, smaller families and more young people. Outside of Sweden middle class suburbs, in generally leaning to the Right, have posed especially major challenges for the efforts of the Left to maintain national majorities. When the Left has overcome these challenges, it has generally done so through rightward shifts that appeal to the interests and orientations of suburbanites outside its urbanized and disadvantaged strongholds.

Metropolitan influences on the dimensions of partisanship

The partisan economic, cultural and cosmopolitanism indexes have revealed more about how the partisan preferences of voters reflect positions on major dimensions of ideology. Where voters live not only influences how they vote on a Left-Right scale, but which dimensions of political ideology have shaped where they place themselves. As much of the literature on partisan competition since the 1970s in Western Europe has demonstrated, political parties no longer position themselves on a unidimensional left-right scale. Increasingly, cultural issues (Kitschelt 1994) and questions related to globalization (Kriesi 2006) now supplement longstanding economic questions about the relations between state and market as the defining issues in elections. For societies outside the developed West, the multidimensional character of partisan competition has been even more evident (Kreuzer and Pettai 2004). In most countries, these cleavages are also cleavages within and between metropolitan regions, and rooted in specific features of metropolitan contexts. The metropolitan variations pose a further challenge to the hypothesis of nationalization. In numerous respects, they confirm that metropolitan consumption interests, culture and diversity now operate as sources of partisan differences (Sellers and Walks, this volume).

As with Left-Right self-placement, voter preferences have been analyzed in terms of the choices among the alternatives that parties themselves have framed. Although parties choose these alternatives, they represent responses to underlying voter preferences embedded in the contexts of localities and metropolitan regions. Each of the indexes addresses an analytically distinct dimension of partisan beliefs (See Appendixes 1-2). The economic index captures issues directly linked to the state and markets, including distributive questions about the welfare state. The culture index derives from questions about domestic cultural issues, such as religion, gender and familial authority. The globalization index encompasses a broad range of issues linked the general difference between cosmopolitanism and ethnonationalism. Although items in this index encompass both cultural and economic issues, the index encompasses any such issues that either are international in scope or concern domestic ethnic and racial diversity. As the indexes for different countries have in some instances employed different survey questions, comparison of the results requires caution about simply setting indexes directly alongside each other. Instead, the comparison here centers the variation in each index around the metropolitan mean value.

The economic dimension

The economic index furnishes a test of the hypotheses about residential consumption interests and household assets. Building on the literature in a number of different countries, Sellers and Walks (this volume) argue that urban and suburban settings foster distinct interests in private markets and the state that influence voter preferences. In urban areas, publicly provided amenities and services as well as limited property assets give rise to stronger preferences for the state. Suburban residents, by contrast, depend more on private property and privately provided, or at most smaller scale local services. As a result, they look more to markets and private solutions than to the state. These urban and suburban interests can either reinforce or cross-cut other interests based on class and occupation.

The results from the country analyzes enabled two different tests of these hypotheses. The parallel typologies of metropolitan localities provided a general view of the ways that similar varieties of towns compare in different countries; the regression models with continuous variables tested related continuous variables as predictors of orientations toward private markets or the state. As expected, both types of indicators confirm that higher socioeconomic status contributes to more promarket orientations in a community (Figure 6, Table 6). By the same token, higher hardship communities and continuous variables for hardship, immigrants and minorities generally contribute to stronger support for parties advocating a state role

[insert Figure 6 and Table 6 about here]

Although these patterns grow partly out of the clustering among rich, middle class and poor segments of the population, other predictors show that voting for premarket parties corresponds to interests in cheap property and amenities on the metropolitan periphery. In five of the seven settled democracies, low density suburbs register higher support for

promarket parties. Multivariate testing with the continuous variables confirms these relationships. In five of the seven settled democracies, places with recent growth voted more in favor of marketization. In every one of these countries except for Sweden, lower population densities also proved as consistent a predictor of promarket voting as they were of conservatism on the overall ten-point scale. Since low density peripheral localities in both Europe and North America often contained significant numbers of less well to do residents, the effects of these interests in consumption and property assets extended beyond the consequences of socioeconomic status alone. In the two North American countries, suburban consumption interests and property assets help to account for the significant support among even high hardship communities for parties of the Right.

Statist parties received consistent support from places with high hardship and minorities. This result might be predicted from class clustering alone. Especially in western Europe and North America, however, the town types as well as the multivariate models again pointed to effects from urban density beyond the influence of social classes. In a total of seven countries, the urban concentrations voted more strongly for more statist parties than the metropolitan average. In Germany, Canada and Switzerland, the urban concentrations averaged even strong support for the Left than in the hardship suburbs (Figure 1). The independent strength of population density in the multivariate models for six of seven North American or Western European countries confirms this consistent relationship.

Two of the three countries where the Left had won, Germany and Sweden, proved partial exceptions to this general tendency. In these countries, middle class or more affluent suburbs also gave stronger support to the economic Left. In different ways, both cases were exceptional. In the Swedish case, under only limited metroplitanization, the middle class suburbs provided support for Social Democrats that the affluent suburbs had not. The divergence between these types of communities was greater than in any other country. In Germany, this effect appears linked to a very small difference between the major parties on the state-market scale. Since SPD and CDU voters expressed similar views of the proper state-market relationship, it is easy to see how affluent voters would have had little trouble voting for the Left. The cultural liberalism and cosmopolitan internationalism of the Schroeder government, as further analysis will show, added positive appeal for highly educated, affluent communities.

The cultural dimension

As Sellers and Walks have also suggested, cultural contrasts between places also play an important role in metropolitan cleavages. Their analysis outlined two dimensions of cultural variation based on traditionalism, on the one hand, and the difference between materialism and postmaterialism on the other. The cultural index, based on attitudes of party voters toward homosexuality, traditional family roles, religion and marriage, tested these differences in a parallel analysis. Although this index itself tested adherence to traditional authority, comparison with the economic index enabled an examination of both dimensions (Table 7, Figure 7). In North America and Western Europe, as

Inglehart's analyzes of postmaterialism have suggested, it has been linked to the Left, while traditionalism and market conservatism have both been stances of the Right. Two other alternatives are possible, however: promarket economic conservatism could accompany cultural liberalism, or cultural conservatism could combine with a more statist economic stance.

[insert Table 7 and Figure 7 about here]

As measured by these indexes, the cultural dimension of political differences generally reinforces the economic one. Comparison demonstrates mostly parallel patterns of variation for the culture index to those for the economic index. The differences between the patterns, contained in the upper left and lower right boxes of Table 7, reveal several types of places where either economic or cultural dimensions have prevailed. The most general contrast appears in the most educated, highest income communities. Affluent enclaves in Sweden, Germany, the U.S. and Poland manifest stronger market conservatism than cultural conservatism. As the multivariate tests confirmed, communities with higher socioeconomic status in Germany, Switzerland the Czech Republic and Poland have also voted more for market conservatism than for cultural conservatism.

On the other side, cultural conservatism has dominated economic conservatism in more contingent ways. In the U.S., homeowners, commuters and older residents all provided support for George Bush in a 2004 campaign that stressed cultural issues. In France in 2002, Jacques Chirac won especially strong support from affluent enclaves and immigrant concentrations through increased reliance on cultural appeals. Cultural conservatism was also linked in distinctive ways to a variety of particular variables among Czech, Polish and Israeli localities.

The globalization dimension

Rather than values linked to traditional culture, it is globalization that marks the clearest new dimension of metropolitan cleavages to cross-cut economic ideology. Here the index incorporates a wide range of issues that partly overlap with both economic ideologies and traditionalism. The critical common thread among the issues in this index concerns attitudes toward international institutions, influences, and markets, and at the same time toward multiculturalism. An index value to the Left here means greater cosmopolitanism; a value to the Right indicates stronger ethnonationalism. Because the established Right and Left parties often maintain similar parties on these issues, voting for such parties on the Right as the French National Front and the Swiss Popular Party, and such parties on the Left as the French Communists and the Greens has disproportionately influenced this index.

Comparison with the economic index brings out the systematic divergences between this issue dimension and the economic one (Table 8). Everywhere except for Great Britain and France, affluent suburbs lean more to the Left on this dimension than on the economic dimension. In Germany, Sweden, and also France, these communities can even

be classified to the Left on this index despite leaning to the Right on the economic index (Figure 8). In the multivariate tests, socioeconomic status shifts in eight of ten countries from a predictor of conservatism on the state-market dimension to a predictor of relative cosmopolitanism.

[insert Table 8 and Figure 8 about here]

Urban concentrations also emerge in most countries as bastions of cosmopolitanism (Figure 8). In Sweden, The U.S., Canada and Switzerland this position corresponds to a more statist position on the state-market index. In Germany, France, the Czech Republic and Poland, urban cosmopolitanism outstrips a relative ambivalence about the state in urban centers. In the multivariate tests, population density is the second most consistently shifting variable, changing to a stronger predictor of more cosmopolitan attitudes in Germany, Switzerland, the United States and the Czech Republic.

Ethnonationalism clearly concentrates in a different set of places than market liberalism. In all six of the Continental countries, high hardship suburbs register higher ethnonationalism. In five of the six, so do low density suburbs. In the U.S. the low density suburbs and high hardship suburbs with fewer minorities share similar tendencies toward ethnonationalism, but there these orientations go along with promarket ideology. The relations of the continuous variables to ethnonationalism are less consistent. In France and Germany as well as the Czech Republic, Poland or Israel, hardship or foreign born residents correspond to ethnonationalism. In the U.S. variables such as older residents, children, homeowners, and commuters exert a parallel effect on community choices. A number of parallel patterns also distinguish Ethnonationalism from cultural conservatism, albeit less starkly (Table 9).

[insert Table 9 about here]

The patterns in this index also enable a test of hypotheses from Sellers and Walks (this volume) about the social and spatial sources of ethnonationalist or cosmopolitan attitudes (Tables 10-11). According to these hypotheses, ethnonationalist support should be higher where the host context is socially homogenous, and higher still when there are population pressures from a growing immigrant, ethnic or racial minority. If the thesis of nationalization were to hold, these differences should distinguish countries rather than smaller scales of analysis. As measured by the Fearon-Laitin fractionalization index, the countries in this study vary widely in their levels of overall diversity (Table 10). Yet levels of diversity at national scale prove to be of limited utility for understanding the variations in ethnonationalism. What emerges most clearly, whether the focus centers on Ethnonationalism as one end of the scale (Table 10) or on Cosmopolitanism at the other (Table 11), are the local and regional variations within countries.

[insert Tables 10 and 11 about here]

Across the variety of levels of national diversity, suburbs with high hardship have supported more ethnonationalist parties (Table 10). Only Canada and Great Britain, with

very different levels of diversity, present national exceptions to this pattern. More limited exceptions may be found in minority hardship suburbs of the U.K., Sweden and the U.S. In Germany, France, Switzerland and the United States, low density suburbs also provide support for ethnonationalist appeals.

By contrast, cosmopolitanism in every country except Canada appears consistently strong in the urban concentrations (Table 11). Affluent suburbs in every type of national context endorse cosmopolitan party as well. In the U.S. and Great Britain, hardship suburbs dominated by minority ethnicities also manifest more cosmopolitan voting.

Difference among metropolitan regions, along with contrasts in wider regional contexts, also shape support for cosmopolitanism and ethnonationalism. Evidence from France, Great Britain and Switzerland suggests that regional variations of this kind have made more of a difference for this dimension of partisanship than for the other dimensions. In countries as diverse as Israel, the United States, France and Poland, the largest, richest and best educated metropolitan regions have generated stronger support for cosmopolitanism. Border regions of France, Jerusalem in Israel, smaller metropolitan regions in Poland, Malmo and Stockholm in Sweden, and central and southern regions of the United States have given rise to more ethnonationalist reaction.

Compared to these variations within countries, the contrasts among countries remain limited. The low, uniform internationalism among parties in Canada may be partly linked to the exceptionally diversity as well as the population pressures there. Among more homogenous countries like East Germany, Great Britain and Poland, affluent or middle class suburbs have been mobilized more effectively around ethnonationalist appeals. In more diverse countries like Canada, Switzerland, the United States and Israel, the relative appeal of ethnonationalism among affluent and middle class voters has remained more limited.

Beyond Western Europe and North America

The multiple dimensions of partisan competition also solve the puzzles that the overall voter self-placement posed in Eastern Europe and Israel. In place of seemingly arbitrary variations between different types of metropolitan localities, comparison of these indexes shows striking and largely consistent patterns. These patterns reflect the limits to metropolitanization and suburbanization in Eastern Europe, and the distinctive forms that both of these processes have taken in Israel.

The economic and globalization indexes vary in remarkably similar ways among the types of localities in East Germany as well as Poland and the Czech Republic (Figure 9). In each country, the urban concentrations and the affluent suburbs stand out from other types of localities more cosmopolitan or internationalist. In Poland and the Czech Republic, though not in East Germany, the urbanized and affluent areas also support marketization. In both countries disadvantaged, low density and middle class suburb vote more ethnonationalist. This concentration of promarket and cosmopolitan orientations is probably characteristic of many other developing and transitional country contexts where

metropolitanization or suburbanization are less advanced. The one major difference between the Czech Republic and Poland appears in the cultural dimension. Although the affluent and urban areas in Poland and East Germany supported a conservative cultural stance, these same types of towns in the Czech Republic voted for culturally liberal parties.

Finally, the indexes reveal more fully why metropolitanization has had distinctive effects on partisanship in Israel (Figure 10). There the cultural conservatism and ethnonationalist support in minority Arab localities dominated the indexes. If party positions on economic matters hardly deviated at all, the starkest differences between localities followed the cultural and globalization dimensions. Urban concentrations, with large proportions of minorities and conservative Jewish residents, remained more conservative along the cultural and globalization dimensions. But survey items about economic philosophy revealed few significant differences among the main parties. Places that differed widely along the other dimensions displayed much less variation along these lines. Metropolitanization had also given rise to an affluent, increasingly suburban middle class that was culturally liberal and cosmopolitan as well as supportive of marketization. In this respect, metropolitan sorting had produced patterns comparable to those that produced suburban majorities in support of neoliberalism in North America and increasingly in Western Europe.

Metropolitanization of partisan cleavages and competition

Across the advanced industrial world and beyond, major recent shifts in political ideology and partisan competition are clearly related to the emerging context of metropolitan settlement. Where dispersed metropolitan settlement has grown into the predominant form of residence, new sources of support for marketization and social conservatism have emerged to shift politics and policymaking to the Right. Parties of the Left that have succeeded in this context have often drawn on strengthened support in urban centers and poor suburbs. But to construct national majorities, they have been forced to shift toward pro-market policies and alter stances toward the welfare state. Only in Sweden, where metropolitanization remains limited has the Left succeeded without such appeals.

As the analysis of the dimensional indexes showed, the new cleavages based in metropolitan places are rooted in cultural orientations as well as economic interests. In developing countries outside of Western Europe and North America, where metropolitan geographies and dimensions of partisan competition differ, separating out these dimensions revealed variations on the same effects. Recently emerging cleavages linked to globalization, refracted by the party systems of various countries in different ways, have also been rooted in largely consistent metropolitan sources. Cross-cutting new cleavages now pit urban concentrations, well to do or middle class communities and more diverse and prosperous regions against poorer communities and regions less integrated into the global economy.

Conclusion: metropolitan sources of political behavior

In most advanced industrial societies, the growth of extended metropolitan regions into the predominant mode of settlement is now an established fact. The impact of these regions on economics and governance has increasingly become apparent. As the analyzes of this book have demonstrated, metropolitanization has also had important consequences for political behavior. Metropolitan and local contexts now play a major role in shaping the most fundamental political act of modern citizenship. Especially in countries with metropolitan majorities, the resulting variations in local interests, institutions, cultural orientations have replaced the urban-rural divide of preindustrial and industrial society with a new political geography. Far from the national uniformity among places predicted by the nationalization thesis, metropolitanization has given rise to entrenched divergences in local patterns of political behavior.

Nuanced attention to local as well as regional variation has brought out these divergences vividly. Partisan cleavages now reflect much more than divisions between social classes, urban and rural areas, or regional ethnic traditions. They are also about the consumption interests, assets, and cultural practices located in distinct types of metropolitan places, and the different positions of metropolitan economies in the global economy. The metropolitanization of middle class and affluent voters throughout much of the advanced industrial world helps to account for the breadth of the political support for marketization and neoliberalism. At the same time, the Left has acquired growing bases of support in urban concentrations and among high income and highly educated communities. The growing diversity and international links of these settings, and the corresponding new patterns of regional and local advantage and disadvantage, have defined a new set of electoral cleavages that cross-cut traditional economic lines of division between Left and Right.

The analysis of voter turnout shows that differences in the most basic act of political participation also vary in ways that can be traced to local and metropolitan sources. From the local and regional perspective of the analysis in this book, examination of these patterns has cast new light on the role of voter mobilization in the layered governance of contemporary societies. The analysis has revealed how metropolitan and local political subcultures have worked in conjunction with national institutions to produce different patterns of local and national electoral participation. In this dimension of political behavior as well, metropolitanization has introduced new local and regional variations that contradict the thesis of nationalization. In some localities, such as the peripheral towns of metropolitan Switzerland and France, metropolitanization has reinforced traditional patterns of localized political participation. In others, like the U.S. and Canada, it has given rise to a variegated metropolitan geography of more and less delocalized patterns. Despite the variety of national contexts, voter mobilization has consistently been linked to such contextual conditions as lower density or smaller community size and to homeownership as well as to greater socioeconomic status.

The combined results from our analyses of turnout and partisanship underscore the new opportunities that metropolitanization poses for parties of the Right, and the challenges it

has created for parties of the Left. Where metropolitan cleavages have grown to dominate national politics, Left parties now rely increasingly on strongholds in the very urban concentrations and disadvantaged communities where electoral participation has consistently remained the weakest and is declining the fastest. Outside of countries that like Sweden have forestalled metropolitanization, Left parties thus face a compounded dilemma. This dilemma helped to account for the seemingly inexorable pressure that parties of the Left have felt to adopt marketized, neoliberal programs and modify culturally liberal positions. The emerging cleavages around globalization and multiculturalism may offer a basis for metropolitan coalition-building across these settled divides. Since these cleavages have so far played a more limited role in party competition itself, their potential for this role remains unclear.

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Figure 1: Relations between national and local electoral participation, overall means by countries




Figure 2: Relations between national and local electoral participations, means by types of suburbs: only countries with ‘high, integrated participation’ (SE=Sweden, FR=France, IS=Israel, WG= West Germany, EG=East Germany)




Figure 3: Relations between national and local electoral participations, means by town types: only countries with 'localized participation' (SW= Switzerland)




Figure 4: Relations between national and local electoral participations, means by town types: only countries with 'low participation' (PL=Poland)




Figure 5: Relations between national and local electoral participations, means by town types: only countries with 'de-localized participation' (CA=Canada, CZ=Czech Republic, GB=Great Britain, US=United States)






Figure 6. Economic index by town type and winning party configurations, for Western Europe and North America

Economic Index by town type (Mixed or winning Right parties)




Economic Index by town type (Winning Left parties)




On y-axis, positive values indicate right, negative values indicate left of metropolitan mean. All values are national sample means by type of town.

Figure 7. Cultural index by town type and winning party configurations, for Western Europe and North America

Culture Index by town type (Mixed or winning Right parties)




Culture Index by town type (Winning Left parties)




On y-axis, positive values indicate right, negative values indicate left of metropolitan mean. All values are national sample means by type of town.

Figure 8. Internationalization index by town type and winning party configurations, for Western Europe and North America




Internationalization Index by town type (Winning Left parties)




On y-axis, positive values indicate right, negative values indicate left of metropolitan mean. All values are national sample means by type of town.


Figure 9. Economic, Cultural and Internationalization indexes by town type, for Eastern Europe



Culture Index by town type (Eastern Europe)




Internationalization Index by town type (Eastern Europe)



On y-axis, positive values indicate right, negative values indicate left of metropolitan mean. All values are national sample means by type of town.

Figure 10. Economic, Cultural and Internationalization indexes by town type, for Israel (z-scores)



On y-axis, positive values indicate right, negative values indicate left of metropolitan mean. All values are national sample means by type of town.

Table 1: Turnout levels in national and local elections, differences in turnout levels (national - local), according to types of metropolitan municipalities

Country	Level of election	Urban concentrations	Hardship suburbs		Middle class suburbs	Low density suburbs	Affluent suburbs	Overall mean	Year of IMO Analysis	IDEA turnout figures ³ (same years)
			High minority	Low minority						
Canada	National	55.3	53.6	48.0	58.5	63.6	60.3	59.0	2000	61.2
	Local ¹	35.4	n/a	23.6	28.3	36.9	40.6	32.9	2000	n/a
	Differential	19.9	n/a	24.4	30.2	26.7	19.7	26.1		n/a
USA	National	49.2	43.4	51.3	58.8	62.0	69.8	59.3	1996-2004	73.1
	Local	24.4	22.9	27.7	31.1	34.6	37.4	31.8	1996-2003	n/a
	Differential	24.8	20.5	23.6	27.7	27.4	32.4	27.5		n/a
Great Britain	National	51.9	53.6	50.5	58.5	61.4	61.8	56.4	2001	59.4
	Local ²	32.2	34.6	29.9	36.2	n/a	37.5	34.4	2004	n/a
	Differential	19.7	19.0	20.6	22.3	n/a	24.3	22.0		n/a
Sweden	National	77.0	73.7	79.4	82.2	82.4	85.5	81.8	1998-2002	80.8
	Local	73.1	68.2	77.4	79.9	80.1	83.3	79.3	1998-2002	n/a
	Differential	3.9	5.5	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.5		n/a
Germany (West)	National	78.8	80.3		81.5	81.1	82.8	81.4	2001	79.1 (W+E)
	Local	50.2	56.0		55.9	62.9	60.0	58.3	2001	n/a
	Differential	28.6	24.3		25.6	18.2	22.8	23.1		n/a
Germany (East)	National	73.3	71.3		73.5	72.6	73.5	72.6	2001	n/a
	Local	49.9	54.8		57.2	61.0	56.4	56.7	2001	n/a
	Differential	23.4	16.5		16.3	11.6	17.1	15.9		n/a
France	National	68.6	70.7	74.8	76.6	78.3	74.4	76.5	2002	79.7
	Local	55.8	63.7	72.2	72.1	80.2	67.2	74.4	2001	n/a
	Differential	12.8	7.0	2.6	4.5	-1.9	7.2	2.1		n/a
Switzerland	National	43.8	41.9		46.0	42.0	47.6	44.4	1999-2003	44.2
	Local	41.9	45.2		51.3	43.9	49.9	47.5	1996-2005	n/a
	Differential	1.9	-3.3		-5.3	-1.9	-2.3	-3.1		n/a

Country	Level of election	Urban concentrations	Hardship suburbs		Middle class suburbs	Low density suburbs	Affluent suburbs	Overall mean	Year of IMO Analysis	IDEA turnout figures ³ (same years)
			High minority	Low minority						
Czech Republic	National	56.2	60.4		63.5	64.1	65.9	58.4	2002	47.6
	Local	31.8	60.4		59.2	68.7	60.5	37.4	2002	n/a
	Differential	24.4	0		4.3	-4.6	5.4	21.0		n/a
Poland	National	52.6	41.2		44.1	42.6	46.5	44.2	2001	40.6
	Local	37.7	51.4		47.3	51.1	49.0	37.2	2002	n/a
	Differential	14.9	-10.2		-3.2	-8.5	-2.5	7.0		n/a
Israel	National	72.4	70.5	75.7	74.5	81.4	79.9	75.0	1999-2003	69.6
	Local	45.9	90.8	70.0	62.7	72.9	59.3	73.7	1998-2003	n/a
	Differential	26.5	-20.3	5.7	11.8	8.5	20.6	1.3		n/a

¹ Municipal turnout analyzed for the 44 municipalities within the Toronto and Vancouver regions

² Greater London Authority Election 2004

³ Nationwide turnout, means for years indicated (source : www.idea.int)

Table 2: Influences on municipal level turnout in local and national elections, overview of country results

	USA		Canada		UK		Germany		Czech Rep.		Sweden		France		Poland		Israel		Switzerland	
	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat
<i>Compositional variables at municipal level</i>																				
% High SES	+	+	+	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	?	0	+
Hardship index	(-)	-	0	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	n.a.	-	-	0	-	n.a.	?	0	-
% Foreign born	0	0	-	(+)	+	-	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?	0	-
% Old residents	+	+	0	+	0	+	+	0	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	(-)	?	0	(+)
% families	n.a.	n.a.	(-)	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	(+)	?	0	+
<i>Contextual variables at municipal level</i>																				
% homeowners	+	+	0	+	0	+	n.a.	n.a.	+	+	+	n.a.	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?	0	0
% residential stability	(+)	+	0	(+)	0	0	+	0	-	0	n.a.	n.a.	-	0	+	+	n.a.	?	0	0
% out-commuters	(-)	0	-	0	0	0	0	+	n.a.	n.a.	-	0	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?	(-)	0
Electoral competition	+	+	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?	-	-
Population size	(-)	0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-	-	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	-	-	0	-	?	-	-
Population density	0	0	-	(-)	0	-	-	0	0	+	0	0	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	(-)	?	0	(+)
Economic diversity	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	-	n.a.	n.a.	-	+	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	?	+	+

+ : significant positive relation to turnout; - : significant negative relation to turnout;
0 : no significant relation to turnout n.a. : relation not tested in country study
Parentheses indicate significance in some but not all models.

Table 3: National Partisan and Sociospatial Contexts

	Welfare state	Year of CSES data	National voter mean (1 (left) - 10 (right))	S.D.	Year(s) of IMO analysis	National electoral winners	Metropolitanization	Metro fragmentation	Gini coefficient	Ethnic fractionalization
(W. Europe, N. America)										
(low metropolitanization)										
Sweden	Social Democratic	2002	4.74	2.56	1998-2002	Left	32%	0.3	25	0.0600
(metropolitan majority)										
Germany	Christian Democratic	2002	4.43	2.28	2002	Left	83%	6.3	28	0.1682
Switzerland	Christian Democratic	2003	5.04	2.48	1999-2003	Mixed	73%	7.3	33	0.5314
France	Christian Democratic	2002	5.16	2.66	2002	Right	52%	10.7	33	0.1032
Canada	Liberal	2004	5.22	1.92	2000	Mod. Right	64%	0.2	33	0.7124
Great Britain	Liberal	2005	5.32	2.1	2001	Left	76%	(low)	36	0.1211
United States	Liberal	2004	5.82	2.37	1996-2004	Mixed	78%	6.4	41	0.4901
(E. Europe, other)										
(low metropolitanization)										
Poland	--	2001	4.58	2.95	2001-2005	Left	42%	0.6	32	0.1183
Czech Republic	--	2002	4.64	2.77	1998-2002	Mixed	28%	3	25	0.3240
(metropolitan majority)										
Israel	--	2003	5.82	3.08	2003-2006	Center/Right	79%	1.3	36	0.3436

Metropolitan fragmentation (Ziegler-Brunn) index combines a measure of local governments/population with the proportion of metropolitan population residing in the central city.

NOTE: Welfare state categories from Esping-Andersen 1990; Left-right self-placement from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) database; Metropolitanization, metropolitan fragmentation, and Gini coefficients from Sellers and Hoffmann-Martinot 2005; Ethnic fractionalization from Fearon 2003.

Table 4: Voter Self-placement, by Region, Country and Type of Locality

Region	Western Europe and North America							Eastern Europe		Other	
	Country	Germany (West)	Great Britain	U.S.A.	Switzer- land	Canada	France	Germany (East)	Poland		Czech Republic
Winning party or parties	Left	Left	Left	Mixed	Mixed /right	Mod. right	Right	Left	Left	Right	Mod. right
Urban concentrations (1-10) (left-right)	4.92	5.30	5.04	5.40	4.86	4.92	5.38	4.72	5.98	5.57	6.35
Hardship suburbs (high minority)	-0.21	+0.09	-0.00	+0.05	+0.34	+0.13	-0.08	+0.13	+0.01	-0.19	-3.33
(low minority)	-0.11		-0.10	+0.48		+0.13	-0.21				+0.38
Middle class suburbs	+0.27	+0.08	+0.20	+0.36	+0.38	+0.04	+0.04	+0.20	+0.05	-0.01	+0.06
Low density suburbs	+0.39	+0.19	+0.19	+0.56	+0.55	+0.12	+0.14	+0.15	-0.14	-0.08	-0.64
Affluent enclaves	+0.92	+0.13	+0.40	+0.49	+0.52	+0.14	+0.19	+0.14	+0.06	+0.32	-0.68
Year(s)	1998- 2002	2001	2001	1996- 2004	1999- 2003	2000	2002	2001	2001- 2005	1998- 2002	2003

Table 5: Significant predictors of voter self-placement, by country

	Sweden	Germany	UK	USA	Switzerland	Canada	France	Poland	Czech Rep.	Israel
<i>Winning parties</i>	Left	Left	Left	Mixed	Mixed/right	Moderate Right	Right	Left	Mixed/Left	Right/Center
<i>Compositional variables</i>										
% High SES	+	-	+	+	0	+	+(income), -(education)	-	+	-
Hardship index	(-)	0	-	-	(-)	+	(-)	-	-	-
% Foreign born	(-)	(-)	-	-	+	-	-		0	+
% Old residents	+	0	+	+	0	+	+		(+)	(-)
% families	0	+	+	(+)	0	0	(-)		(+)	N.A.
<i>Contextual variables</i>										
% homeowners	+	N.A.	+	+	+	0	+		+	(-)
% residential stability	0	N.A.	+	-	(-)	+	-	-	N.A.	N.A.
% out-commuters	0	0	(-)	(+)	(+)	(-)	-		N.A.	-
Population/housing growth	(+)	+	0	+	(+)	+	(-)		(+)	N.A.
Population density/size	0	-	-	-	(-)	-	-	+	+	+
Economic diversity	0	0	(-)	+	(+)	0	-		(+)/(-)	N.A.

+ positive relation to right self-placement

0 no relation to right self-placement

- negative relation to right self-placement

Parentheses indicate significance in some but not all models, or bivariate correlations

Table 6: Economic Consumption Interests and Metropolitan Political Restructuring

Location	Suburbs	Inner city/Other
<p>Economic interests</p> <p>Middle and upper class</p>	<p><i>Economic preference</i> Markets (strong)</p> <p>Affluent enclaves (SE, GB, FR, SW, CA, CZ, EG, IS, PL, (US)) Middle class suburbs ((GB), (CZ), (EG), (PL)) Low density suburbs (CA, FR, SW, US, (WG))</p> <p>High SES+ (CA, US, UK, SE, SW, CZ, PL, (IS)) New growth + (CA, US, GE, (SE), (SW), (CZ))</p>	<p><i>Economic preference</i> State (moderate)</p> <p>Urban concentrations (CA, SW, US, CZ, PL (GB), (SE), (FR)) Middle class suburbs ((SE))</p> <p>High SES- (GE) Density- (CA, US, UK, FR, GE, SW) Density + (CZ, PL)</p>
<p>Working class and poor</p>	<p><i>Economic preference</i> Markets</p> <p>Hardship suburbs (CA) Hardship low minority suburbs (US) Low density suburbs (FR, SW, US, (WG))</p> <p>Hardship + (CA) Minorities + (SW)</p>	<p><i>Economic preference</i> State</p> <p>Urban concentrations (CA, SW, US, CZ, PL (GB), (SE), (FR)) Hardship suburbs (SW) (Esp. high minority suburbs (SE, US)) (Esp. low minority suburbs (esp. GB, FR))</p> <p>Hardship- (US, GB, SE, PL, CZ, IS) Minorities- (CA, US, GB, SE, GE, FR, IS)</p>

Table 7: Cultural Bases of Metropolitan Political Restructuring

Materialism	Materialism (Survival/ Security)	Post-Materialism (Fulfillment / Idealism)
Traditionalism		
Low (Rejection of Authority)	<p><i>(Economic to the Right of Cultural)</i></p> <p><i>Shifting places:</i> Affluent enclaves (SE, WG, US*, EG, PL) Urban Concentrations (FR, PL, EG)</p> <p><i>Shifting variables:</i> SES- (GE, SW, CZ, PL) Foreign born - (SW) Older residents - (SW) Population density- (GE, SW) Homeowners - (SW, CZ)</p>	<p><i>(Cultural/ Economic Left)</i></p> <p><i>Consistent places :</i> Urban concentrations (WG, SE, US, CA) High hardship suburbs (GB,, FR, CZ, (SW), (WG)) (High minority (US)) (Esp. low minority suburbs (GB, FR)) Middle class suburbs (WG, CA) <i>Consistent variables:</i> Hardship - (US, FR) Foreign born - (US) Population density - (US, FR) Residential stability - (US, FR)</p>
High (Acceptance of Authority)	<p><i>(Cultural/ Economic Right)</i></p> <p><i>Consistent places :</i> Affluent enclaves (GB, CA, SW, CZ) Low density suburbs (WG, SE, US) High hardship suburbs (WG) Urban concentrations (CZ) <i>Consistent variables:</i> SES+ (FR) Families w. children+ (GE) Older residents+ (FR) Homeowners+ (FR) Local growth+ (US, GE) Economic diversity (US)</p>	<p><i>(Cultural to the Right of Economic)</i></p> <p><i>Shifting places:</i> Affluent enclaves (FR) Middle class suburbs (SE) Hardship suburbs (PL, IS) Low density suburbs (PL)</p> <p><i>Shifting variables:</i> Foreign born+ (FR) Older residents + (US, CZ) Homeowners + (US) Commuters + (US) Hardship + (CZ, PL)</p>

*US place rating from comparison of 2000 and 2004 results.

Table 8: Cosmopolitanism and Metropolitan Political Restructuring:

Economic Index	Market liberal	Statist
<p>Cosmopolitanism</p> <p>High (Cosmopolitan)</p>	<p><i>(Cosmopolitanism to the Left of Economic conservatism)</i></p> <p><i>Shifting places:</i></p> <p>Affluent enclaves (SE, WG, US*, CA, SW, FR, EG, CZ, PL)</p> <p>Urban Concentrations (WG, FR, EG, CZ, PL)</p> <p>High hardship suburbs (CA, CZ)</p> <p><i>Shifting variables:</i></p> <p>SES- (SE, GE, US*, SW, FR**, CZ, PL, IS)</p> <p>Foreign born – (SW)</p> <p>Older residents – (SW, CZ)</p> <p>Families w. children – (SW, CZ)</p> <p>Population density- (GE, US, SW, CZ)</p> <p>Homeowners – (CZ)</p> <p>Commuters – (IS)</p> <p>Local growth – (SE, CZ)</p> <p>Economic diversity – (FR)</p>	<p><i>(Cosmopolitan / Economic Left)</i></p> <p><i>Consistent places :</i></p> <p>Urban concentrations (SE, US, CA, SW)</p> <p>High hardship suburbs (GB, FR, PL (SW), (WG))</p> <p>(Hardship minority (US))</p> <p>(Esp. low minority suburbs (GB, FR))</p> <p>Middle class suburbs (WG, CA, FR)</p> <p><i>Consistent variables:</i></p> <p>Hardship – (US*, FR)</p> <p>Minorities – (US*)</p> <p>Population density – (US*, FR)</p> <p>Residential stability – (US*, FR)</p> <p>Local growth – ((FR))</p>
<p>Low (Ethnonationalist)</p>	<p><i>(Ethnonationalist/ Economic Right)</i></p> <p><i>Consistent places :</i></p> <p>Affluent enclaves (GB)</p> <p>Low density suburbs (US)</p> <p>Hardship low minority suburbs (US)</p> <p><i>Consistent variables:</i></p> <p>SES+ (FR**)</p> <p>Minorities + (FR***, SW)</p> <p>Families w. children+ (GE)</p> <p>Older residents+ (FR)</p> <p>Homeowners+ (SE, FR, SW)</p> <p>Local growth+ (US*, GE)</p> <p>Economic diversity (US*, (SE))</p>	<p><i>(Ethnonationalism to the right of economic index)</i></p> <p><i>Shifting places:</i></p> <p>High hardship suburbs (SE, WG, FR, SW, CZ, PL)</p> <p>(Esp. low minority (SE))</p> <p>Middle class suburbs (EG, CZ, PL)</p> <p>Low density suburbs (WG, SW, FR, CZ, PL)</p> <p><i>Shifting variables:</i></p> <p>Hardship + (FR, CZ, PL, IS)</p> <p>Foreign born+ (GE, FR, IS)</p> <p>Older residents + (US*)</p> <p>Families w. children + (US*)</p> <p>Homeowners + (US*)</p> <p>Density + (IS)</p> <p>Commuters + (GE, US*)</p> <p>Local growth + (SW)</p>

*US from comparison of 2000 and 2004 results.

**Higher education -, median income +.

*** Local influence negative, metro influence positive.

Table 9: Cultural Bases of Metropolitan Political Restructuring: Ethnonationalism and Cosmopolitanism

Cultural Conservatism Cosmopolitanism	Low	High
High	<p><i>(Ethnonationalism weaker than Cultural Conservatism)</i></p> <p><i>Shifting places:</i> Affluent enclaves (WG, EG, CA, PL, CZ) Middle class suburbs (WG, FR) Urban Concentrations (FR, PL, CZ, EG) High hardship suburbs (CA)</p> <p><i>Shifting variables:</i> SES- (FR**, CZ, PL) Older residents - (SE) Families w. children - (SW) Population density- (SE, SW) Homeowners - (SW, CZ) Economic diversity - (FR)</p>	<p><i>(Cosmopolitan/Cultural Left)</i></p> <p><i>Consistent places:</i> Urban concentrations (WG, SE) High hardship suburbs (FR, (SW), (WG)) (Esp. low minority suburbs (GB, FR))</p> <p><i>Consistent variables:</i> SES - (FR**, GE, SW, (SE)) Hardship - (FR) Minorities - ((GE)) Population density - (FR, GE) Residential stability - (FR) Commuters - (FR) Local growth - ((FR))</p>
Low	<p><i>(Ethnonationalist Cultural Conservatism)</i></p> <p><i>Consistent places :</i> Affluent enclaves (GB, CA, SW) Low density suburbs (WG, SE, US, CA) High hardship suburbs (GE, CA, IS) (Hardship low minority (US)) Urban concentrations (PL)</p> <p><i>Consistent variables:</i> SES+ (FR) Hardship + (CZ, PL, IS) Minorities + (IS) Families w. children+ (GE) Older residents+ (FR) Homeowners+ (SE, GE, FR) Density + (IS) Local growth+ (GE)</p>	<p><i>(Ethnonationalism stronger than Cultural Conservatism)</i></p> <p><i>Shifting places:</i> High hardship suburbs (FR, SW, CZ) Low density suburbs (FR, SW)</p> <p><i>Shifting variables:</i> Hardship + (FR, CZ) Foreign born+ (FR*, SW) Older residents + (SW, CZ) Homeowners + (SW) Local growth + (SW, CZ)</p>

NOTE: Regression models for Canada, USA and Great Britain not included due to similar variation for cultural and internationalization indexes.

*Local influence negative, metro influence positive.

**Higher education -, median income +.

Table 10: Concentrated Ethnonationalism, by National Diversity and Population Pressures

(National-level predictions in bold italics, Fearon-Laitin Ethnic Fractionalization in bold parentheses)

Host Diversity Immigration/ Migration	Low (Culturally Homogenous)	High (Culturally Diverse)
High (Significant Local Population Pressure)	<p><i>(Strong ethnonationalist support)</i></p> <p>Germany (.1682) (East Germany) High hardship suburbs Low density suburbs Middle class suburbs (EG)</p> <p>United Kingdom (.1211) Affluent enclaves</p> <p>France (.1032) (Eastern border and South) High hardship suburbs Low density suburbs</p>	<p><i>(Low ethnonationalism)</i></p> <p>Canada (.7124) (Low variation)</p> <p>Switzerland (.5314) (German regions) High hardship suburbs Low density suburbs</p> <p>United States (.4901) (Midwest, South) (Smaller metropolitan areas) Low density suburbs Hardship low minority suburbs</p> <p>Israel (.3436) (Jerusalem) High hardship suburbs</p>
Low (Insignificant Local Population Pressure)	<p><i>(Moderate ethnonationalist support)</i></p> <p>Poland (.1183) (Smaller metropolitan areas) High hardship suburbs Middle class suburbs</p> <p>Sweden (.0600) Malmo, Stockholm regions Hardship low minority suburbs</p>	<p><i>(Spatial sorting, limited ethnonationalism)</i></p> <p>Czech Republic (.324) (Smaller metropolitan areas) High hardship suburbs</p>

Table 11: Concentrated Cosmpolitanism, by National Diversity and Population Pressures

(National-level predictions in bold italics, Fearon-Laitin Ethnic Fractionalization Index in bold parentheses)

Host Diversity	Low (Culturally Homogenous)	High (Culturally Diverse)
Immigration/ Migration		
High (Significant Local Population Pressure)	<p><i>(Weak cosmopolitanism)</i> Germany (.1682) (West Germany) Urban concentrations Middle class suburbs Affluent suburbs (EG) United Kingdom (.1211) Urban concentrations High hardship suburbs (esp. low minority) France (.1032) (Central regions) (Largest metropolitan areas) Urban concentrations Affluent enclaves</p>	<p><i>(High cosmopolitanism)</i> Canada (.7124) (Low variation) Switzerland (.5314) (French regions) Urban concentrations United States (.4901) (Coastal regions) (Largest metropolitan areas) Urban concentrations Hardship high minority suburbs Israel (.3436) (Haifa, Tel Aviv regions) Low density suburbs Affluent enclaves Urban concentrations</p>
Low (Insignificant Local Population Pressure)	<p><i>(Moderately weak cosmopolitanism)</i> Poland (.1183) (Larger metropolitan areas) Urban concentrations Affluent enclaves Sweden (.0600) (Goteborg) Urban concentrations</p>	<p><i>(Spatial sorting, moderate ethnonationalism)</i> Czech Republic (.324) (Prague metropolitan area) Affluent enclaves Urban concentrations</p>

Appendix 1 : Survey items used to compile dimensional issue indexes

		FR	UK	US	SE	SP	IS	PL	GE	CA	CZ	SW
Economic												
competition good-harmful for people (Q54C)	EVS19992000	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	
state give more freedom to-control firms more effectively (Q54D)	EVS19992000	X	X		X	X		X	X		X	
equalize incomes-incentives for individual effort (Q54E)	EVS19992000	X	X								X	
private-government ownership business (Q54F)	EVS19992000	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	
Gov. must reduce differences in income	ISSP Social equality 1999	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Rich people pay more taxes	ISSP Social equality 1999		X	X	X	X	X			X		
Differences in income are too large	ISSP Social equality 1999		X	X	X	X	X			X		
Gov resp: if want job, provide job	ISSP Religion 1998	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Gov resp: reduce incm dif rich+poor	ISSP Religion 1998	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Are you favourable to higher taxes on high incomes or are you favourable to lower taxes on high incomes												X
Cultural												
how important is God in your life (Q33)	EVS19992000	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
how important in your life: religion (Q1F)	EVS19992000	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	

		FR	UK	US	SE	SP	IS	PL	GE	CA	CZ	SW
abortion if couple doesnt want more children approve/disapprove (Q50B)	EVS19992000	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Workg mom: pre school child suffers	ISSP Gender family 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Workg woman: family life suffers	ISSP Gender family 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Couple livg together without marriage	ISSP Gender family 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Divorce best solution w marr. problems	ISSP Gender family 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Sexual relations before marriage?	ISSP Religion 1998	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		
Sexual relations 2 adults same sex?	ISSP Religion 1998	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Husbands earn money, wifes job family	ISSP Religion 1998	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Gay freedom	ESS 2004											X

Globalization

I would rather be a citizen of[Country] than of any other country in the world	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong. [Country] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

		FR	UK	US	SE	SP	IS	PL	GE	CA	CZ	SW
Free trade leads to better products becoming available in[Country].	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
International organizations are taking away too much power from the[Country Nationality] government.	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books is damaging our national and local cultures.	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
It is impossible for people who do not share [Country?s] customs and traditions to become fully [Country?s nationality]	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Immigrants increase crime rates	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Immigrants are generally good for [Country?s] economy	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in[Country]	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Immigrants improve[Country Nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Children born in[Country] of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become[Country Nationality] citizens	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

		FR	UK	US	SE	SP	IS	PL	GE	CA	CZ	SW
Legal immigrants to[Country] who are not citizens should have the same rights as[Country Nationality] citizens.	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
[Country] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants?	ISSP National identity 2003	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Benefits from being member of [European Union]: EU MEMBERS	ISSP National identity 2003	X		X		X		X			X	
[Country] should follow [European Union] decisions, even if it does not agree with them.	ISSP National identity 2003	X		X	X	X		X		X	X	
Do you think Switzerland should join the EU or stay away from the EU												X
Do you think that foreigners in Switzerland should have equal chances compared with Swiss citizens? Or do you think Swiss citizens should have better chances?												X

Appendix 2 : Party positions used to compile voter self-placement and dimensional issue indexes

	Voter Self-Placement	Economic Index	Cultural Index	Globalization Index
ISRAEL				
Likud	7.89 1.79	3.52	4.66	5.24
Israel one+gesher+me	3.44 2.06	3.74	4.19	4.76
Shase	8.33 1.76	3.77	5.73	6.20
Meretz	2.43 2.04	3.85	3.65	3.96
Haehud haleumi	8.00 1.85	4.41	5.24	5.33
Shinuy	5.33 2.03	4.01	3.69	4.41
Am ehad	4.73 2.15	3.30	5.16	5.17
Israel baliya	6.59 1.87	3.40	4.75	3.83

	Voter Self-Placement	Economic Index	Cultural Index	Globalization Index
Hadash	1.97 3.11	3.63	5.85	2.99
CANADA				
Liberal	5.13 1.82	5.86	4.07	4.62
PC	6.16 1.75	6.21	4.05	4.63
NDP	4.15 1.76	4.99	3.51	4.47
BQ	4.62 1.75	4.56	3.63	4.60
SWEDEN				
C (Centre Party)	5.84 1.27	5.03	3.71	4.80
FP (Liberals)	6.37 1.59	5.72	2.68	4.18
KD (Christ Democr)	6.97 1.51	5.43	4.77	4.65
MP (Ecologists)	3.64 2.66	4.81	2.88	4.06
M (Liberal Conserv)	7.39	6.45	2.87	4.59

	Voter Self-Placement	Economic Index	Cultural Index	Globalization Index
	1.80			
S (Social Democrats)	3.42	4.63	2.81	4.67
	1.87			
V (Socialists)	1.93	3.99	2.26	4.17
	1.72			
GREAT BRITAIN				
Conservative	6.59	5.40	4.23	5.43
	1.73			
Labour	4.52	4.56	3.84	5.03
	2.13			
Liberal Democrats,SLD	4.82	4.85	3.79	4.72
	1.61			
SNP (Scot National)	4.83	4.52	3.29	4.78
	1.17			
USA				
Democratic	4.69	5.78	4.68	4.74
	2.43			
Republican	6.87	6.75	5.24	5.16
	1.76			
FRANCE				

	Voter Self-Placement	Economic Index	Cultural Index	Globalization Index
FR extrême-gauche	2.3	3.87	2.21	4.00
FR Parti communiste	2.42	3.83	3.01	4.86
FR Parti socialiste	4.62	4.85	3.24	4.30
FR Les Verts	3.59	4.74	3.04	4.25
FR Union pour la démocratie française	6.37	5.72	4.61	4.88
FR Rassemblement Pour la République or UMP	6.56	6.15	4.59	5.39
FR Le Front National de Jean-Marie Le Pen	7.85	5.40	4.42	6.57
POLAND				
SLD (Left Democratic Alliance – post-communists)	4.02			5.06
PSL (Polish Peasant Party)	5.45			5.34
Samoobrona (Self-defence)	5.48			5.61

	Voter Self-Placement	Economic Index	Cultural Index	Globalization Index
UW (Union of Freedom)	6.09			4.72
PO (Civic Platform)	6.99			4.65
PiS (Law and Justice)	7.14			5.04
LPR (League of Polish Families)	7.28			5.56
AWS (Electoral Action Solidarity)	7.34			5.18